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Reforming the Law Applicable to the Award
of Restoration Damages as a Remedy
for Environmental Torts
JAMES R. Cox*
I. Introduction
Few aspects of the law applicable to environmental tort
claims are as challenging as the question of the manner in which
damages should be equitably apportioned. Traditional paradigms
that have evolved from interests in promoting economic efficiency
fail to take into account the unique character of cases involving
environmental contamination. Such cases invoke public interests
that are rarely considered in more traditional property-damage
cases, such as those involving erosion, flooding or harm to
appurtenances.
This article argues that traditional doctrines that allow the
award of restoration damages in limited circumstances should be
reformed in order to allow the broader application of such awards.
The article will first review some of the various policy rationales
that support such an evolution of the law. It will then turn to a
discussion of the various doctrines applicable to restoration-dam-
age awards. Finally, the article will suggest that courts involved
in the adjudication of environmental tort claims should consider
the expansion of existing equitable trust doctrines and apply them
to awards of environmental restoration damages. Such an expan-
sion would remove the perception that toxic-tort plaintiffs are un-
justly enriched by cash awards that may exceed the value of the
affected property, and would permit the creation of a framework
that would ensure that damage awards are actually expended for
property cleanup.
* Judicial Research Counsel, EarthJustice, Washington, D.C. This article was
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the author's LL.M. curriculum
at Georgetown University Law Center.
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II. Review of Public-Policy Issues Applicable to
Cases of Environmental Contamination
Before turning to an examination of existing doctrines appli-
cable to awards of restoration damages, a review of some of the
public interests involved in an environmental tort case is in order.
The most obvious of these is the public's interest in the health and
safety of its citizens.
A. The Public's Interest in the Health and Safety of its
Citizens
Members of the public have a clear interest in protecting
themselves from unknowing and unexpected exposures to harmful
contaminants. Proponents of strict property-right protections
might contend that a property owner has the right to permit haz-
ardous conditions to exist on his or her property, subject only to
the state's right to bring an enforcement action under applicable
environmental statutes. Such a simplistic view ignores the fact
that cases involving claims of property contamination are replete
with competing interests that transcend generations and property
lines; and state enforcement agencies with limited budgets cannot
be presumed to adequately represent politically powerless neigh-
bors and future generations.
Some members of the community-children in particu-
lar-cannot be expected to observe property boundaries in every
situation, and should not be forced to rely on the benevolence and
attentiveness of an owner of contaminated property. Moreover, an
argument exists that other members of the community, including
those who engage in outdoor recreational activities like hunting or
fishing, should not be forced to rely on the owners of contaminated
property to restrict access to areas of contamination. Even where
property owners may have acted to adequately restrict access to
contaminated property by unknowing members of the general
public, the same restrictions might not prevent access by pets,
livestock and wildlife.
The public also has an interest in preventing the spread of
contamination to adjoining properties and to groundwater. Haz-
ardous chemicals that are subject to erosion processes, leaching or
aeolian transport may readily migrate onto adjoining properties.
Such contaminants may also pose a risk to animals and plant life
that can facilitate the spread to surrounding areas. Even the most
thorough attempts by a property owner to restrict access to prop-
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erty are not likely to prevent contaminant migration. Therefore,
the public has an interest in ensuring the neutralization or re-
moval of harmful contamination that exists on private property.
For all of these reasons, a paradigm that permits the award of
damages based on the cost of environmental restoration in a tort
action, to a party that is motivated to actually expend those funds
on cleanup, is one that is grounded in sound public policy.
B. The Public's Economic Interests
Because of the many uncertainties that exist with regard to
the migration of, and the public's potential access to, harmful en-
vironmental contaminants, property values are sure to be affected
in areas that surround the polluted property. Such effects can re-
duce resale values and tax revenues. The public therefore has an
interest in effectuating cleanup to protect these values.
With specific regard to the sum of money that represents the
cost of cleanup, the public has an interest in allocating that sum of
money to the person or entity that is most likely to effectuate
cleanup promptly and effectively. In general, although as between
a property owner and a polluter, the owner might at first glance
be seen as the party who is more likely to effectuate cleanup, such
might not always be the case. For example, a non-resident owner
of contaminated property may be willing to abandon the property
and enrich himself personally with cleanup funds awarded to him
in a tort action. In contrast, a polluter-who may be a prior owner,
neighbor, or the holder of leasehold or easement-who has lost on
the issue of liability may wish to expend the cleanup funds him-
self. He may do this in order to bring certainty to the process of
foreclosing further liability as to future plaintiffs, or to improve
his relations with the public. Nevertheless, awards of restoration
damages generally presume that the recipient of such an award,
having expended the resources associated with litigation and
demonstrated the facially stronger interest in remediation, will
actually use the award to effectuate cleanup.
In addition to the foregoing interests, the public has an eco-
nomic interest in preventing the need for the expenditure of public
funds to effectuate cleanup. Such an expenditure may become
necessary if the party who is allowed to retain cleanup funds be-
comes insolvent, or is otherwise unable or unwilling to actually
perform the necessary cleanup. By requiring the polluter to pay
for cleanup, external costs become incorporated into the product
whose manufacture or processing caused the contamination, thus
20031
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eliminating an effective subsidy to the polluter and permitting al-
ternative products and industries to compete on a level playing
field. Parochial interests may prefer the subsidy at the expense of
environmental interests, however, thus fostering the proverbial
"race to the bottom" of environmental standards or the creation of
environmental "sacrifice zones".
Finally, the public has an interest in deterring the conduct
that resulted in the contamination in the first instance. By mak-
ing an example of those who engage in conduct that is negligent,
reckless, or intentionally designed to result in the contamination
of property, the public may deter the commission of similar wrong-
doings elsewhere. In the interest of preserving enforcement re-
sources, the public may prefer to leave the litigation of such
matters to private litigants. The punitive aspect of allowing
awards of restoration damages that exceed property values may
thus tip the balance toward the allowance of such awards to par-
ties who are likely to effectuate cleanup.
C. The Interest in Intergenerational Equity
Unlike the chattels and appurtenances that may be subject to
a more traditional property-damage case, land is a finite natural
resource. The public has an interest in preserving that resource
for the benefit of future generations. Similarly, groundwater that
may be affected by environmental contamination is a resource
that should be managed and preserved for the benefit of a commu-
nity's descendants. This concern for "intergenerational equity"1 is
one that evokes a strong public interest, and that calls for the ex-
penditure of cleanup funds such as those that may be the subject
of an award of restoration damages.
Having addressed the various public interests that call for the
expenditure of funds-on the part of someone, at least-to effectu-
ate the cleanup of contaminated property, the discussion that fol-
lows will turn to an examination of the various doctrines that
have emerged within the common law that permit the award of
restoration damages in certain instances.
1. See generally, Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity, in GLOBAL Ac-
CORD 333-53 (Nazli Choucri ed. 1993).
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III. Overview of Doctrines Applicable to Awards of
Restoration Damages
Various doctrinal developments within the common law have
resulted in the formulation of criteria that permit the award of
restoration damages in cases involving claims of tortious harm to
land. Perhaps the most oft-cited of these can be found within the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. According to that treatise:
§ 929 Harm to Land From Past Invasions
(1) If one is entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting
from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction of
value, the damages include compensation for
(a) the difference between the value of the land before the harm
and the value after the harm, or at his election in an appropriate
case, the cost of restoration that has been or may be reasonably
incurred .... 2
The comments to this Restatement provision elaborate this
principle:
[T]he reasonable cost of replacing... land in its original posi-
tion is ordinarily allowable as the measure of recovery .... If,
however, the cost of replacing the land in its original condition
is disproportionate to the diminution in the value of the land
caused by the trespass, unless there is a reason personal to the
owner for restoring the original condition, damages are mea-
sured only by the difference between the value of the land before
and after the harm....
On the other hand, if a building such as a homestead is
used for a purpose personal to the owner, the damages ordina-
rily include an amount for repairs, even though this might be
greater than the entire value of the building.3
The principles set forth in the Restatement have provided the ba-
sis for a number of the decisions of courts that have addressed the
issue of restoration damages. In spite of this fact, decisions rely-
ing on the Restatement have resulted in surprisingly little of the
consistency and predictability that might otherwise have allowed
for the efficient allocation of resources and the achievement of pol-
icy objectives. The sections that follow will highlight some of the
factors, derived from the Restatement paradigm, that have influ-
enced courts' decisions as to the issue of restoration damages.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1979) (emphasis added).
3. Id. cmt. b.
20031
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A. Preferences for Diminution-in-Value and Trial-Court
Discretion
Several fundamental principles can be derived from the some-
what cryptic rule set forth in Section 929 of the Restatement. The
first of these is the observation that the "general rule" appears to
be that under normal circumstances, an award of damages in a
property-damage case should be measured by the diminution in
property value that results from the tortious conduct. Only in "ap-
propriate cases" can an award exceed that amount, and be mea-
sured instead by the cost of restoration. The Restatement provides
no guidance as to what constitutes an "appropriate case," but ap-
pears to leave such determination entirely to a court's discretion.
The provision states in an accompanying comment, however, that
even in such an appropriate case, where restoration costs are "dis-
proportionate" to the diminution in value, damages should default
back to the difference in value before and after the harm.4 Even
where restoration costs are disproportionate, however, where
"there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the original
condition," the disproportionality of the amount may be ignored,
and the full cost of restoration awarded. 5
The lack of a bright-line rule for determining what is an "ap-
propriate case" for an award of restoration damages-absent a
disproportionately high cost of restoration-has been the exercise
of a great deal of discretion by trial courts. Some courts have elu-
cidated the need for such discretion and etched it into their opin-
ions. An example of a case that has applied the Restatement, and
derived therefrom a preference for discretion, can be found in the
case of Board of County Commissioners of Weld County v. Slovek.6
In that case, plaintiffs brought action against a county-owned
gravel pit after water from the pit flooded plaintiffs' property. 7
Upon concluding that the county had been negligent in the man-
ner in which it had maintained its property, the trial court
awarded damages based on the diminution in value of the dam-
aged property.8 The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that dam-
ages should be measured by the full cost of restoration.9 Plaintiffs
appealed, arguing that where property constitutes a private resi-
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 723 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986).
7. Id. at 1311.
8. Id. at 1311-13.
9. Id.
782 [Vol. 20
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss2/5
REFORMING THE LAW
dence and the plaintiff has an interest in having the property re-
stored, plaintiffs should be entitled to those cost-of-repair
damages proximately caused by defendant's negligence.10 Relying
on the Restatement, the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the
Colorado Court of Appeals' reversal of the award, holding that
[i]f the damage is reparable, and the costs, although greater
than original value, are not wholly unreasonable in relation to
that value, and if the evidence demonstrates that payment of
market value likely will not adequately compensate the prop-
erty owner for some personal or other special reason, we con-
clude that the selection of the cost of restoration as the proper
measure of damages would be within the limits of a trial court's
discretion.11
It is important to note that in Slovek, the Supreme Court of
Colorado refused the Court of Appeals' invitation to establish a
bright-line rule holding that where plaintiffs have a personal rea-
son to have the property restored-as where the property is the site
of plaintiffs' private residence-the cost of restoration should be-
come the prima facie measure of damages. 12 Instead, according to
the Colorado Supreme Court:
[T]he Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "in an appro-
priate case" the property owner should be allowed to choose as
the measure of damages either the diminution of market value
or "the cost of restoration that has been or may be reasonably
incurred." The Restatement does not explicitly define what is an
"appropriate case." However, in justifying the deviation from
the market value standard, a Restatement comment relies on
such factors as the nature of the owner's use of the property...
and the nature of the injury-in particular, whether the injury is
reparable and at what cost....
10. Id. at 1313 (citing Slovek v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984)).
11. Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1317.
12. Id. at 1313. According to the appellate court:
We agree with plaintiffs' contention that where, as here, the property
is a private residence and the plaintiffs' interest is in having the property
restored, plaintiffs are entitled to those "cost of repair" damages proxi-
mately caused by defendant's negligence. The award of such repair costs
will more effectively return plaintiffs to the position they were in prior to
the injury.
Id. (quoting Slovek v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984)).
2003]
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We agree that the factors enumerated in [the] Restatement
... are important in determining whether a case is appropriate
for application of "cost of restoration" [damages] .... We con-
clude, however, that the considerations governing what is an
"appropriate case" for departure from the market value stan-
dard are not susceptible to reduction to a set list and that no
formula can be devised that will produce litmus-test certainty
and yet retain the flexibility to produce fair results in all
cases.... We prefer to leave the selection of the appropriate mea-
sure of damages in each case to the discretion of the trial court,
informed by the considerations previously discussed. 13
While the reluctance of the courts to establish "bright-line"
rules for determining whether an award of restoration damages is
appropriate in a particular case may be seen as a laudable at-
tempt to retain discretion in the trial courts to determine the pro-
priety of such damages, it may also be seen as a reluctance or
inability to engage in a detailed analysis of the various policy fac-
tors that are involved. The absence of such an analysis is espe-
cially conspicuous in cases of environmental contamination, in
which profound public-policy interests are at odds with each other.
Moreover, a court's abdication of its responsibility to consider com-
peting interests and attempt to establish a bright-line rule leaves
uncertainty in an area in which unpredictability is itself a cost, as
well as a barrier to cleanup and redevelopment. Nevertheless, the
section that follows traces the evolution of one such bright-line
rule that has done little more than expand the realm of confusion.
B. The Temporary/Permanent Damage Distinction
Whereas some courts have refused to establish an unwaver-
ing rule regarding the appropriateness of awards of restoration
damages, a number of courts have held that where damage to
property is "temporary and subject to restoration," the proper
measure of damages is the cost of restoration. Where the harm is
permanent, however, damages are measured only by the diminu-
tion in the property's value. 14
13. Id. at 1315-16 (emphasis added) (citations & footnotes omitted).
14. See, e.g., Buras v. Shell Oil Co., 666 F. Supp. 919, 923 (S.D. Miss. 1987); Bor-
land v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979); G&A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska
Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379 (Alaska 1974); State v. Diamond Lakes Oil Co., 66
S.W.3d 613 (Ark. 2002); Kratze v. Indep. Order of Oddfellows, Garden City Lodge #11,
500 N.W.2d 115 (Mich. 1993); R&S Dev., Inc. v. Wilson, 534 So. 2d 1008 (Miss. 1988);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1985); Millers Mut. Fire Ins.
[Vol. 20
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The opinion in the Mississippi case of R&S Development, Inc.
v. Wilson 15 presents a standard formulation of the rule regarding
temporary versus permanent damage. In that case, plaintiffs
brought an action against a developer who was found to have im-
properly bulldozed an alleyway across plaintiffs' land.16 In assess-
ing the proper measure of damages, the court ruled:
As a general rule, the measure of damages for injury to land
is the difference in value of the land before and after the tres-
pass. However, this rule applies only in cases of permanent in-
jury to realty. Where, as in this case, the injury to the land "is
temporary and subject to restoration, the proper measure of
damage is the cost of restoration."17
When the terms "temporary" and "permanent" are given their
literal meaning, the distinction between temporary and perma-
nent damages makes little sense, especially insofar as the catego-
rization of environmental contamination in one manner or the
other may determine the appropriate measure of damages. Virtu-
ally all such contamination can be deemed as "temporary" to the
extent that chemical contaminants eventually break down into
less harmful agents. Likewise, such contamination may be
deemed "permanent" to the extent that such degradation may
take millennia to occur. Moreover, even after cleanup, residual
contamination and stigma may remain with the property virtually
forever.
In an apparent attempt to mold the temporary/permanent
distinction into a more workable rule, courts have resorted to de-
fining the terms "temporary" and "permanent" in a manner that
relates little to the longevity of the contaminants' hazardous char-
acter. The opinion in the case of Highland Industrial Park, Inc. v.
BEI Defense Systems Co.,18 describes such an approach. In that
case, a property owner sued a military rocket manufacturer after
the latter had contaminated leased property. 19 On the issue of the
appropriate measure of damages, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of plaintiff, ruling that
Co. of Tex. v. Wildish Constr. Co., 758 P.2d 836 (Or. 1988); Bean v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 276 A.2d 613 (Vt. 1971).
15. 534 So. 2d 1008 (Miss. 1988).
16. Id. at 1009-11.
17. Id. at 1012 (citations omitted) (quoting Buras, 666 F. Supp. at 923).
18. 192 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. Ark. 2002).
19. Id. at 942-43.
2003] 785
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[tihe law in Arkansas is clear that the proper measure of com-
pensation for damage to property is either the cost of repair or
restoration of the damaged property or the difference in the
value of the property immediately before the damage and the
value of the property immediately after the damage.... [Wihere
restoration is not possible, because the damage is permanent,
then diminution in value becomes the remedy that best effectu-
ates the goal of compensatory damages.
BEI ... bases it [sic] arguments on a proffered definition of
'permanent damage' gleaned from a tortured attempt to trace
the development in Arkansas law of the concept that whether
damage is permanent "depends upon its connection with the
soil." This Court finds that Arkansas decisions are much more
clear in their development of the concept that designation of
damage as temporary hinges upon the potential for repair or
restoration. 20
The court ruled that on the facts before it, no reasonable jury
could conclude otherwise than that the damage was remediable
and therefore temporary. 21 Thus, although the defendant in
Highland Industrial Park may have attempted to return the rule
distinguishing temporary and permanent damages to an interpre-
tation that more accurately reflects the rule's literal meaning-at
least as it would be applied to a case of property contamination-
the court rejected such literal interpretation and clarified that the
rule does not mean what it actually says.
Reference to strained explanations of the temporary/perma-
nent distinction in the case law confirms the proposition that the
rule makes little sense, except to the extent that the term "tempo-
rary" is deemed to be synonymous with the phrase: "subject to res-
toration." Consider, for example, the rule recited by the Alabama
Supreme Court in the case of Borland v. Sanders Lead Co.2 2 In
that case, the court reversed a trial court's denial of liability to
plaintiff landowners who lived adjacent to a lead smelter that
emitted noxious gases. 23 As to the rule to be applied by the trial
court on remand with regard to the issue of damages, the court
held:
20. Id. at 944-45 (citing inter alia Bush v. Taylor, 197 S.W. 1172 (Ark. 1917); Ben-
ton Gravel v. Wright, 175 S.W.2d 208 (Ark. 1943)) (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 947.
22. 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
23. Id. at 525-26.
786 [Vol. 20
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[I]n determining the amount of damages recoverable by a plain-
tiff whose property has been trespassed upon,... it must first
be determined whether the alleged intrusion is of a permanent
nature or of a continuing nature. If the injury is permanent...
[t]he measure of damages means the difference in the fair mar-
ket value of the property before and after the trespass ....
If the nature of the injury is continuous (i.e., during the ten-
ure of the trespass), the plaintiff can recover for the use of his
property or its fair rental value. (Also, plaintiff may be able to
recover the cost of restoration if this, plus rental value, is less
than the diminution in value.) 24
It is important to note initially that the court in Borland
framed the distinction that determines the measure of damages as
one that classifies the injury as either "permanent" or "continu-
ous," rather than permanent or temporary. In so doing, the opin-
ion may provide insight into the origins of the so-called temporary/
permanent distinction in the first instance. By describing a "con-
tinuous" injury as one that exists "during the tenure of the tres-
pass," the court appears to make a distinction between those
damages that occur only for the duration of a polluter's activity,
and thus abate when he ceases that activity or vacates the prem-
ises; 25 and permanent damages that last beyond the lessee's or
prior owner's tenancy. The Borland court's use of the term "con-
tinuous" lends it a meaning that is synonymous with the ordinary
definition of the word "temporary."26 In the case of residual haz-
ardous contamination, of course-a case that essentially did not ex-
ist among the early cases defining the law applicable to property
damages-applying the Borland characterization would result in
virtually all such damages' being characterized as "permanent."
The redefinition of the term "temporary" such that it is synony-
mous with the phrase "subject to restoration" may thus be seen as
an attempt by courts to create inroads into an anachronistic para-
digm that otherwise would never have allowed awards of restora-
tion damages in cases of contamination-at least to the extent that
such damages exceed the property's diminution in value.27
24. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
25. See id.
26. See id. ("If the nature of the injury is continuous (i.e., during the tenure of the
trespass). . . .") (emphasis added).
27. See R&S Dev., 534 So. 2d at 1012-13; G&A Contractors, 517 P.2d at 1386.
According to the court in G&A Contractors:
The test whether damages to real estate are permanent or temporary is
whether the act producing the injury is productive of all of the damage
20031 787
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The tortured analyses of courts attempting to apply Borland-
like reasoning to cases of environmental contamination lends sup-
port to the contention that the temporary/permanent distinction
simply does not provide a workable paradigm in such cases. The
fact that most courts applying the rule have qualified the term
"temporary" to mean "subject to restoration" reveals a recognition
of this postulate. Environmental contamination can usually be
seen as having both remedial and non-remedial components. The
remediable component may be considered to be that element of
contamination which is above applicable regulatory requirements,
or which exceeds other reasonable and appropriate threshold
levels or quantities. 28 The non-remedial component may be
deemed to be that level of contamination which falls within regu-
latory action levels, or which otherwise cannot be remediated
without an unreasonably exorbitant expenditure of funds. A more
reasoned approach than the one set forth in Borland, therefore,
would employ separate measures of damages for the two compo-
nents of contamination, awarding restoration damages for the re-
mediable fraction, and diminution-in-value damages for the
remainder. 29
which can result from the injury, and no further damage can ensue, or
whether the injury is intermittent and occasional, or the cause thereof ca-
pable of being remedied, removed or abated. In the former case the dam-
ages are permanent and in the latter case the damages are temporary.
G & A Contractors, 517 P.2d at 1386 (emphasis added) (quoting Riddle v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co., 73 S.E.2d 793, 803 (W. Va. 1952)).
28. The concept of an "applicable or relevant and appropriate requirement," or
"ARAR", is derived from federal "Superfund" law, as enacted pursuant to the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). Pursuant to CERCLA, plaintiffs may recover the neces-
sary costs of responding to a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance.
42 U.S.C. § 9607. In addition to other costs, such response costs may include the cost
to remediate property to within applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements
(ARARs). Id. § 9621(d).
29. Several courts have "severed" components of the harm in this manner, award-
ing restoration damages for that portion of damage that is subject to restoration and
diminution-in-value damages for the remainder. See, e.g., Morris v. Ciborowski, 311
A.2d 296, 299 (N.H. 1973) (allowing cost to restore land as a result of encroachment of
airport onto property, in addition to diminution-in-value damages as a result of in-
creased overflights); Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1324 (Wyo. 1984) (allowing
cost to repair damage to homes causing water leaks, in addition to reduction-in-value
damages due to "public awareness of a water problem.").
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C. Limitations on Recovery Defined by the Value or
Diminution-in-Value as a Result of the Harm
The question of whether in some instances there is a limita-
tion on the recovery of restoration damages where the costs of res-
toration exceed some limitation, such as the market value of the
property or the diminution in the property's value as a result of
the harm, is an important one that bears further examination.
Notably, Restatement section 929 contains no limitation on recov-
ery other than one that limits restoration damages where such an
award would be disproportionate to the diminition in the prop-
erty's value. 30
A thorough review of the various formulations of limitations
on recovery of restoration damages was conducted by the court in
Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans v. Loui-
siana Gas Servicing Company.31 In that case, the owner of an
apartment complex brought action against a gas service supplier
after the supplier's equipment malfunctioned, causing a fire that
damaged the complex.3 2 In reviewing the state of the law in other
jurisdictions applicable to property-value limitations on awards of
restoration damages, the court observed:
[Slome jurisdictions have placed . . . restrictive limits on when
an owner whose property has been tortiously damaged can re-
cover the full cost to repair or restore .... [Miany of these courts
essentially limit the owner's damage to the lesser of cost to re-
pair and diminution in market value caused by the damage.
Other courts, although applying cost to restore as the appropri-
ate measure of damages in all cases of reparable injury to prop-
erty, use the fair market value of the property before the injury
... as a ceiling on the damage award.33
The court in Roman Catholic Church similarly reviewed the
various criticisms of value-based limitations on the recovery of
restoration damages:
Recently, courts and commentators have criticized these
types of simplistic tests which require the automatic application
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt. b and accompanying text
(1979).
31. 618 So. 2d 874 (La. 1993).
32. Id. at 875.
33. Id. at 877 (citing S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ind. Ins. Co., 383 N.E.2d 387, 395
(Ind. 1978); "L" Invs., Ltd. v. Lynch, 322 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Neb. 1982); Stratford Thea-
ter, Inc. v. Town of Stratford, 101 A.2d 279, 280 (Conn. 1953)).
2003] 789
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of limitations on an owner's recovery of the cost to restore or
repair his damaged property. "Such ceilings on recovery not
only seem unduly mechanical but also seem wrong from the
point of view of reasonable compensation. If the plaintiff wishes
to use the damaged property, not sell it, repair or restoration at
the expense of the defendant is the only remedy that affords full
compensation.... [Moreover,] '[t]o hold that appellant is with-
out remedy merely because the value of the land has not been
diminished, would be to decide that by the wrongful act of an-
other, an owner of land may be compelled to accept a change in
the physical condition of his property, or else perform the work
of restoration at his own expense."' 34
As a result of these and other observations regarding the ap-
propriate measure of damages, the court in Roman Catholic
Church set forth a "rule of thumb" that incorporated no strict
property-value limitation, except to the extent that the full cost of
restoration may be limited to diminution-in-value where:
the cost of restoring the property in its original condition is dis-
proportionate to the value of the property or economically
wasteful, unless there is a reason personal to the owner for re-
storing the original condition or there is a reason to believe that
the plaintiff will, in fact, make the repairs. 3 5
As has been stated, reference to Section 929 of the Restate-
ment reveals that there is no property-value limitation contained
within the Restatement provision itself. An argument can be
made, however, that such limitation derives from the qualifica-
tion, contained within Section 929, that the provision relates only
to "harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting
to a total destruction of value."36 Nevertheless, the provision itself
is silent with respect to harm occurring to land that equals or ex-
ceeds the value of the property.
The comment to the Restatement provision at issue is equally
cryptic with regard to the question whether in the absence of a
34. Id. (quoting Henniger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
Dandoy v. Oswald Bros. Paving Co., 298 P. 1030, 1031 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)) (citations
omitted).
35. Id. at 879. But cf Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 2003 La. LEXIS 613 (La. 2003)
(holding that the damage limitations set forth in Roman Catholic Church do not apply
in a breach-of-contract case).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
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"personal reason" to fully restore property, a property-value limi-
tation exists. Comment 'b' to Section 929 states that
[e]ven in the absence of value arising from personal use, the rea-
sonable cost of replacing the land in its original position is ordi-
narily allowable as the measure of recovery....
On the other hand, if a building such as a homestead is
used for a purpose personal to the owner, the damages ordina-
rily include an amount for repairs, even though this might be
greater than the entire value of the building.37
The first of these sentences appears to make clear that absent a
personal reason to restore, there is no limitation on recovery de-
fined by the value of the property. In the second, however, the
hypothetical seems to suggest that only where there is such a per-
sonal reason can there be recovery that exceeds the property's
value. The result is a degree of ambiguity as to the question
whether under the Restatement, there is any limitation on recov-
ery of restoration damages based on the value of the property.
Nevertheless, as observed by the court in Roman Catholic Church,
some courts have removed any such uncertainty and have affirma-
tively decided that such a limitation exists, at least where there is
no exception for personal reasons. 38
The problem of discerning whether the law imposes a limita-
tion on recovery of restoration damages based on the value, or
diminution-in-value, of property, is compounded in a case that in-
volves environmental contamination. Consider, for example, a hy-
pothetical case involving such damage, in which there has been no
state or federal enforcement action, and yet the contamination on
the property exceeds regulatory thresholds. In such an instance,
restoration costs may well exceed the appraised value of the prop-
erty, and yet a market analysis might show that a willing buyer
might purchase the property for a positive value and take the risk
that there will be no such enforcement action in the foreseeable
future. Thus, there has been no total destruction of market value,
and yet restoration costs would exceed the property's worth. In
jurisdictions that limit awards to the property's value or diminu-
tion-in-value in such instances, the remaining expense of cleanup
must be borne by the owner. There is thus a strong disincentive to
actually effectuate cleanup, and an incentive instead to simply sell
37. Id. cmt. b.
38. See Roman Catholic Church, 618 So. 2d at 879.
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the property to someone who is willing to take the risk that
cleanup may never be required.
Finally, the cited case law and the Restatement do not make
clear whether the value-based limitation should be waived for
public, rather than personal reasons. While the desire to effectu-
ate cleanup may be considered "personal", a consideration of the
manner in which cleanup costs should be allocated implicates pub-
lic interests that are not a necessary element of traditional doc-
trines applicable to awards of restoration damages. The section
that follows will examine the "personal reasons" exception in more
detail.
D. The "Personal Reasons" Exception to Value-Based
Limitations on the Recovery of Restoration Damages
According to the comments to Section 929 of the Restatement,
if
the cost of replacing the land in its original condition is dispro-
portionate to the diminution in the value of the land caused by
the trespass, unless there is a reason personal to the owner for
restoring the original condition, damages are measured only by
the difference between the value of the land before and after the
harm.39
An example of a decision addressing the "personal-use" exception
may be found in the case of St. Martin v. Mobil Exploration &
Producing U.S.4°
In St. Martin, the court addressed a situation in which defen-
dant oil companies had been found to have breached their duties
to maintain spoil banks along access canals that traversed certain
Louisiana marshlands, as a result of which substantial portions of
the marsh had eroded. 41 The trial court awarded damages based
on the cost of restoring the marshland, valued at $10,000 per acre,
rather than on any devaluation of the property's market price of
$245 per acre.42
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals initially re-
viewed Louisiana precedent applicable to the award of restoration
damages. According to the court:
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt. b (emphasis added).
40. 224 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 2000).
41. Id. at 403-04.
42. Id. at 410.
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Under Roman Catholic Church v. Louisiana Gas Serv. Co.,
restoration damages in excess of property value are available
only where there is "a reason personal to the owner for restoring
the original condition or there is a reason to believe that plain-
tiff will, in fact, make the repairs."
In the present case, the district court found that the St.
Martins have demonstrated genuine interest in the health of
the marsh through their efforts on behalf of the Mandalay Wild-
life Refuge, including a $140,000 gift to the Nature Conservancy
to support its creation of the refuge . . .and continuing aid
through the donation of labor and resources. The St. Martins
live adjacent to the marsh in question, and Mr. St. Martin has
used it for hunting and other recreational purposes for a consid-
erable period of time .... Michael St. Martin attempted repairs
of the canal banks . . . and undertook other restorative projects.
Under these circumstances, the St. Martins' case falls within
the Roman Catholic Church allowance of greater than market
value damages. 43
The court in St. Martin focused on plaintiffs' recreational use
of the property in question, and their continuing care for its pres-
ervation in the form of restorative work and donations of labor
and resources, to conclude that plaintiffs had personal reasons for
restoring the property that entitled them to restoration dam-
ages.44 The question left open by both the cited case law and the
Restatement, however-a question that is central to the principal
thesis of this article-is whether restoration costs may exceed the
total value of the property where there are arguably no personal
reasons, but rather public policy reasons-such as the desirability
of protecting unknowing members of the public and preserving
property for future generations-for nevertheless awarding the full
cost of restoration. The troublesome nature of this unanswered
question is confounded by the fact that courts applying the "per-
sonal-use" exception have focused on plaintiffs' residential and
recreational uses of their properties, rather than the public's in-
terest in having the property restored. Cases invoking the excep-
tion have often involved situations in which the plaintiffs private
residence has been located on the property, or he or she has in-
tended to use it recreationally.45 A few cases have focused on
43. Id. at 410-11 (citation omitted) (quoting Roman Catholic Church, 618 So. 2d
at 879-80).
44. Id. at 409.
45. E.g., Keitges v. VanDermeulen, 240 Neb. 580, 590-91 (1992) ("[Wlhen the
owner of land intends to use the property for residential or recreational purposes ...
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plaintiffs' private interests in developing their properties commer-
cially.46 Still others have focused on plaintiffs' aesthetic or histor-
ical interests.4 7 In any event, it is clear that the "personal-
reasons" exception to any limitation on damages based on prop-
erty value, or on diminution-in-value, does not provide a clear ba-
sis for determining that an award of restoration damages is
appropriate in a case involving environmental contamination.
E. Limits on Recovery Based on Proportionality or
Reasonableness
Having shown that the "personal-reasons" exception to any
perceived property-value or proportionality requirement con-
tained within the Restatement and interpreting case law provides
no clear basis for determining whether the full cost of restoration
should be awarded in an environmental case, and having shown
further that the Restatement itself is unclear as to the question
whether there should be some limitation on recovery based on
property value or diminution-in-value, the discussion will turn to
an examination of the extent to which the requirement of "propor-
tionality" or "reasonableness" have been interpreted to limit such
an award.
The principal language of Section 929 of the Restatement con-
tains no limitation on damages based on any measure of propor-
tionality. The comment to Section 929, however, states that "[i]f
... the cost of replacing the land in its original condition is dispro-
portionate to the diminution in the value of the land caused by the
trespass, unless there is a [personal reason to restore], damages
are measured only by [diminution-in-valuel."48
It is important to recall that the general rule set forth in the
Restatement provides that restoration damages are equally availa-
ble to plaintiffs as are diminution-in-value damages, subject only
to the limitation that it be an "appropriate case." As stated, how-
ever, the comment to Restatement Section 929 contains the further
limitation of "proportionality". The "personal-reasons" exception,
as established pursuant to the same comment, is not an exception
the owner is not limited to the difference in value of the property before and after the
damage ....").
46. E.g., G&A Contractors, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379.
47. E.g., Maloofv. United States, 242 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. Md. 1965) (highlight-
ing plaintiffs desire to create "a shrine to John Hanson and to establish a cultural
center where artists could congregate and where he could display his art treasures").
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt. b (1979).
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to any general rule establishing diminution-in-value as a measure
of damages, but rather an exception to the proportionality require-
ment. Thus, under the literal language of the Restatement, the
cost of restoration is only limited by the requirements of "appro-
priateness" and "proportionality", and the latter limitation does
not apply if there is a "personal reason" for allowing the full cost of
restoration in any event.
It is also important to note that the proportionality require-
ment contained within the Restatement utilizes as a yardstick the
diminution in value of the property as a result of the harm, not
the value of the property itself.49 This fact brings to light several
important observations. First, it must be possible that the costs of
restoration may be disproportionate to the diminution in value of
a parcel of property, and yet not exceed the total value of the prop-
erty. If this were not the case, it would not make sense for Section
929 to limit its scope to instances of harm "not amounting to a
total destruction of value,"50 while still providing a proportionality
requirement. However, the converse must also be true: it must be
possible for restoration costs to exceed the value of the property,
and yet not be disproportionate to the reduction in value. In such
an instance, the Restatement does not make clear what the appro-
priate measure of damages should be. The full range of options
exists, of course, including: the diminution in the property's
value; the full value of the property; or the full cost of restoration.
Where the cost of restoration is found to be excessive or dis-
proportionate to either the value of property or its diminution as a
result of the harm at issue, both the Restatement and the opinion
in Roman Catholic Church articulate a curious result. 51 Specifi-
cally, in such an instance, both authorities hold that the "default"
measure of damages should be the diminution in the property's
value. 52 However, if justifications exist for awarding restoration
damages except to the extent of the disproportionate amount,53
why should a court not reduce the award in such instances to the
cost of restoration that is not disproportionate, rather than to an
49. In contrast, the court in Roman Catholic Church formulated the rule of pro-
portionality using the value of the property as a yardstick. Roman Catholic Church,
618 So. 2d at 879.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1) (1979).
51. See Roman Catholic Church, 618 So. 2d at 879-80; see also supra text accom-
panying note 46.
52. Roman Catholic Church, 618 So. 2d at 879-80; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 929 cmt. b.
53. See Roman Catholic Church, 618 So. 2d at 880.
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amount arbitrarily represented by some fraction of the property's
value? It would seem that no clear justification exists to do the
latter. In the case of Roman Catholic Church, at least, the rule set
forth by the court would seem to be dicta to that extent-as the
court ultimately awarded the full cost of restoration 54-and the
question remains whether the court might have reformulated the
rule it articulated in a case in which the full cost of restoration
were found to be unreasonable or disproportionate.
The court in Roman Catholic Church conducted an extensive
review of case law applying the "reasonableness" or "proportional-
ity" exception. According to the court: "[T]he courts often state
that some limits exist to the amount that can be recovered: e.g.,
the repair must be 'practical' and 'reasonable', expenditures are
allowable unless 'wholly disproportionate to the value of the land,'
or 'disproportionate to actual injury,' or 'economically wasteful."' 55
However, "extensive damages are often awarded as cost of restora-
tion."56 "In only a few cases have courts refused to award the full
cost to restore because the expense was truly exorbitant."57
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1316 (Colo.
1986)).
56. Id. at 879 (citing Morris v. Ciborowski, 311 A.2d 296, 298-99 (N.H. 1973)
($16,000.00 to replace trees); Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 181 A.2d 487, 491-92 (N.J.
1962) (awarding $25,605.00 for structural damage from jet engine testing although
diminution in value was $3,700.00); G&A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses,
Inc., 517 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Alaska 1974) (awarding $12,550.00 for restoring vegetation
to a few acres of tract purchased for $4,000.00 per acre); Gross v. Jackson Township,
476 A.2d 974, 975-76 (Pa. 1984) (awarding $9,674.00 for replanting shrubs removed
by construction in widening a road); Melton v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 1066, 1069,
1075 (D.D.C. 1980) ($90,000.00 to complete a $40,000.00 restoration job); Trinity
Church v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 502 N.E.2d 532, 533 n.3, 536 (1987)
(awarding $3.6 million to repair structural damage to an historic church building
even though church had no present intention to restore)); see also Highland Indus.
Park Inc. v. BEI Def. Sys. Co., 192 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (W.D. Ark. 2002) (refusing to
limit an award of restoration damages, noting that "awards for rectification of hazard-
ous waste contamination, often at costs 'grossly disproportionate' to land value, are
regularly upheld and often statutorily mandated.").
57. Roman Catholic Church, 618 So. 2d at 879 (citing Henninger v. Dunn, 162
Cal. Rptr. 104, 106, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding $241,257.00 to restore trees and
undergrowth "manifestly unreasonable" in relation to land value which increased
from $179,000.00 to $184,000.00 because defendant bulldozed unauthorized road on
land); Maloofv. United States, 242 F. Supp. 175, 184-88 (D. Md. 1965) (holding cost to
replace vegetation limited to $77,660.00 to approximate but not duplicate actual pre-
existing condition); Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 364 So.2d 604, 608-09 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1978) (holding owners of one-eighth undivided interest in 550 acres of
land injured by toxic waste were limited in recovery to the value of their interest,
$25,000.00, where cost of restoration sought was $170 million)).
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The case of Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc.58
presents an interesting application of the proportionality require-
ment in an environmental case. In Ewell, plaintiffs owned an un-
divided interest in land located adjacent to property on which
defendant had operated a commercial industrial waste disposal fa-
cility, at which drums of toxic waste had been buried.59 Some of
the wastes had leaked onto plaintiffs' property. 60 The court af-
firmed the jury's finding of liability on the defendant.6 1 In assess-
ing the proper measure of damages, the court observed:
We think that the proper measure of damages must be de-
termined from the circumstances of each case, considering such
factors as the extent of the damage; the use to which the prop-
erty may be put; extent of economic loss, both as to value and
income; and the cost of and practicability of restoration ....
[The property's] value was set at $375.00 per acre, or
slightly over $200,000.00 for the 550 acres affected, by the only
expert witness who testified as to that point. The restoration of
the property.., would cost 170 million dollars....
Under those circumstances, we are of the opinion that the
proper measure of damages is the diminution in value of the af-
fected property .... The jury obviously accepted the testimony
of plaintiffs' witnesses, since they awarded the full value of their
interest in the property to plaintiffs. We cannot say that this
finding is manifestly erroneous .... In view of our finding that
the jury made the maximum award permissible under the cir-
cumstances of this case, we see no point in detailing or com-
menting on these rulings.62
Several aspects of the court's opinion in Ewell warrant fur-
ther consideration. First, although the court does not invoke the
Restatement or other precedent establishing a strict proportional-
ity limitation on restoration damages, both the court and the jury
apparently considered the 170-million-dollar restoration cost to be
exorbitant in relation to the value of plaintiffs' interest in the
property.63 As a result, the court determined that it was of the
opinion "that the proper measure of damages is the diminution in
58. 364 So.2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
59. Id. at 606.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 609.
62. Id.
63. See id.
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value of the affected property."64 In spite of this determination,
the court affirmed the award of damages measured by the full
value of plaintiffs' interest in the property.6 5
Secondly, the glaring omission from the court's opinion in
Ewell are the interests of the state and the general public in hav-
ing the property cleaned up. In the absence of an award of the full
cost of restoration, where is the incentive, or indeed the require-
ment, to clean up the property? Certainly the court's and the
jury's refusal to award restoration costs would likely have been
tempered by the observation that there was likely no affirmative
requirement that the plaintiffs actually use the award to clean up
the property, nor had there apparently been any enforcement ac-
tion on the part of the state requiring such cleanup. As a result,
from one point of view, the defendants may be seen to have se-
cured the use of a dangerous and inexpensive disposal facility,
without the necessity of resort to a costly permitting and oversight
process. Moreover, the result creates within the defendants a dis-
incentive to apply strict measures to contain the release of pollu-
tion, and arguably places on taxpayers the requirement to fund
and effectuate cleanup sometime in the distant future. From an-
other point of view, plaintiffs in such an instance should not re-
ceive a windfall in the form of restoration damages simply because
the state has not acted to effectuate cleanup.
The section that follows will examine in more detail the ex-
tent to which evidence of a plaintiffs intention to clean up-or al-
ternatively, a statutory obligation to do so-impacts the analysis of
whether an award of the full cost of restoration is warranted.
F. Intention or Obligation to Clean Up
As has been observed, a principal impediment to an affirma-
tive rule establishing the full cost of restoration as the default
measure of damages in cases involving damage to property is the
concern that the plaintiff will not actually use the award to effec-
tuate cleanup. This was the concern that motivated the court in
Roman Catholic Church to establish a "rule of thumb" holding
that disproportionate damages should not be awarded unless
"there is a reason to believe that the plaintiff will, in fact, make
the repairs."66 The court in St. Martin found such evidence in
64. Ewell, 364 So. 2d at 609.
65. See id.
66. Roman Catholic Church, 618 So.2d at 879.
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plaintiffs' "attempted repairs of the canal banks ... and ... other
restorative projects,"67 and affirmed the award of the full cost of
restoration.68
One court has developed a novel and well-reasoned exception
to its own general rule limiting damages to the value of the prop-
erty in an environmental case. In Nischke v. Farmers &
Merchants Bank & Trust,69 the court addressed a situation in
which plaintiffs' property had been contaminated by a leaking un-
derground storage tank. In addressing the appropriate measure
of damages, the court observed:
[T]he general rule in Wisconsin is that a property owner's dam-
ages are the lesser of the cost of repair or the property's dimin-
ished value. The rationale for this rule is to ensure a property
owner only recovers her actual loss. . . . [A]warding the cost of
repair in excess of [the property's] value would give the property
owner a windfall and be an inefficient use of economic resources
.... However, we conclude that the general rule is inapplicable
in this case....
... [T]he discharge of a hazardous substance is an environ-
mental hazard to the citizens of Wisconsin .... Under [the Wis-
consin code], Nischke has a duty as a landowner in possession of
discharged hazardous substances to take remedial measures to
restore the environment.
Thus, assuming the [defendant] was the negligent cause of
the leak, its negligence has made Nischke legally obligated to
incur costs to restore her property. These are recoverable as the
normal measure of compensatory damages, despite the fact such
expenses may exceed the diminution in fair market value.70
In its opinion, the court in Nischke responded to any sugges-
tion or implication that in the event the state did not commence
an enforcement action to ensure cleanup, plaintiff might be un-
justly enriched. 71 According to the court, plaintiffs "obligation to
take [remedial] measures does not hinge upon the [enforcement
agency]'s caseload or whether it has brought an enforcement ac-
tion against her."72 This observation focuses on the fundamental
67. St. Martin, 224 F.3d at 411; see supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
68. St. Martin, 224 F.3d at 404, 411.
69. 522 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
70. Id. at 551-52.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 552.
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paradox associated with an award of restoration damages: if
plaintiff is not required by an enforcement action, or by a third-
party civil action brought by neighboring property owners, to actu-
ally use the award to clean up the property, how are the public's
interests, and those of future property owners, protected?
The aforementioned paradox could conceivably be resolved if
the court in such an instance were to establish a constructive trust
for the benefit of the property, or on behalf of present, future and
adjoining landowners. The trustee in such an instance would pos-
sess a fiduciary duty to ensure effective cleanup of the property.
This hypothesis will be examined more fully below. 73
G. Restoration Damages as a Punitive Measure
Some courts appear to have been more amenable to an award
of restoration damages that exceeds property value-based limita-
tions where the conduct of the defendant has been particularly
egregious. The New Hampshire case of Morris v. Ciborowski74
presents such an instance.
In Morris, defendant airport owner had repeatedly ap-
proached plaintiff, an adjoining landowner, for the purpose of at-
tempting to negotiate the purchase of plaintiffs land.75
Defendant desired the land in order to establish a "clear zone"
around the airport that would permit defendant to obtain ap-
proval from the New Hampshire Aeronautics Commission to oper-
ate the airfield commercially. 76  Plaintiff refused each of
defendant's offers to purchase the property, whereupon defendant
bulldozed the property in any event, "clear[ing] part of the parcel
he had continually tried to buy, destroying or removing shrubs
and trees, boundary lines, fences, fouling a brook, and interfering
with [plaintiffs] other incidents of ownership."77 The court af-
firmed an award of damages measured by both the cost to restore
plaintiffs property and the diminished value associated with in-
creased overflights as a result of the modification. 78
In assessing the propriety of the trial court's award of restora-
tion damages, the court in Morris did not stop with simple resort
to traditional doctrines that permit such an award. Instead, the
73. See infra Part IV.
74. 311 A.2d 296 (N.H. 1973).
75. Id. at 298.
76. Id. at 297-98.
77. Id. at 298.
78. Id. at 299.
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court continued its analysis by pointing to the egregiousness of
defendant's conduct. According to the court: "We cannot say on
the record before us that the verdict 'exceeds any rational ap-
praisal of the damages or is manifestly exorbitant' in view of the
evidence of malice which permitted the application of a more lib-
eral rule of damages."79
While there appear to be very few decisions that address the
proposition that a defendant's egregious conduct might justify an
award of restoration damages where such an award might other-
wise be limited, such a proposition may draw support from deci-
sions of courts sitting in equity. An example of such a decision
may be found in the Colorado case of Golden Press, Inc. v.
Rylands.80
In Rylands, plaintiffs brought action against a neighboring
property owner who had constructed a building that partially en-
croached plaintiffs' property.81 The trial court granted an injunc-
tion directing defendant to remove those offending portions of the
building.8 2 On appeal, the court addressed the propriety of the
trial court's grant of injunctive relief:
Where the encroachment is deliberate and constitutes a
willful and intentional taking of another's land, equity may well
require its restoration regardless of the expense of removal as
compared with damage suffered therefrom; but where the en-
croachment was in good faith, we think the court should weigh
the circumstances so that it shall not act oppressively ...
Where defendant's encroachment is unintentional and slight,
plaintiffs use not affected and his damage small and fairly com-
pensable, while the cost of removal is so great as to cause grave
hardship or otherwise make its removal unconscionable,
mandatory injunction may properly be denied and plaintiff rele-
gated to compensation in damages.8 3
79. Id. at 299 (quoting Jackson v. Leu-Pierre, 296 A.2d 902, 904 (N.H. 1972)) (cit-
ing Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 68 (N.H. 1972) ("[Wlhen the act in-
volved is wanton, malicious, or oppressive, the compensatory damages awarded may
reflect the aggravating circumstances.") (citations omitted); Loney v. Parsons, 284
A.2d 910 (N.H. 1971)); cf. Chevron Oil Co. v. G.B. Snellgrove, 175 So. 2d 471, 474
(Miss. 1965) ("As a general rule, the measure of damages in action[s] for ... injury to
land where there is no willful trespass is the difference in value in the before-and-after
damage to the premises." (emphasis added)).
80. 235 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1951).
81. Id. at 593.
82. Id. at 594.
83. Id. at 595 (citing inter alia 5 JOHN NORTON POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 508 (3d. ed. 1905)).
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Insofar as the award of an injunction requiring a defendant to
expend the costs of restoration does not seem to offend equitable
notions of fairness-at least to the extent that the defendants' con-
duct has been egregious-an award of damages measured by the
cost of restoration in a similar instance should not be deemed con-
trary to common-law principles. The question remains as to how
such basis for an award of restoration damages might interplay
with otherwise-allocated punitive damage awards, or might be
seen to conflict with policies against such awards in jurisdictions
that forbid them.
IV. The Equitable Trust as a Precaution Against
Unjust Enrichment
The principal impediment to wider acceptance of awards of
the full measure of restoration damages in cases of environmental
contamination is surely the concern that plaintiffs will be unjustly
enriched where they are not required to expend the recovered
sums on actual property restoration. As a result, the necessity of
effectuating cleanup could fall on taxpayers, or on others who re-
motely appear in the chain of causation. Alternatively, otherwise
useful parcels of property may simply be left as "sacrifice zones"
whose remediation would be left to future landowners, or to the
forces of nature. During the interim, the existence of hazardous
toxins on the property could expose unknowing members of the
public to a significant health risk. Each of these results would be
contrary to the public interest.
One way to resolve the dilemma presented by this challenge
to the public interest would be to allow courts awarding restora-
tion damages to create a "constructive trust" or "equitable trust."
Such a trust could be created for the benefit of future property
owners, neighbors, and/or for interested members of the general
public.
Judge Cardozo described a constructive trust as "the formula
through which the conscience of equity finds expression. When
property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder
of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial
interest, equity converts him into a trustee."8 4 The purpose of
such a constructive trust is to prevent unjust enrichment. Accord-
ing to the Restatement of Restitution, "[a] constructive trust is im-
posed not because of the intention of the parties but because the
84. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919).
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person holding the title to property would profit by a wrong or
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to keep the
property."' 5
The Supreme Court of Florida further elaborated the princi-
ples supporting the imposition of a constructive trust:
A constructive trust is one raised by equity in respect of
property . . .where . . .it is against equity that it should be
retained by him who holds it. Constructive trusts arise purely
by construction of equity, independently of any actual or pre-
sumed intention of the parties to create a trust, and are gener-
ally thrust on the trustee for the purpose of working out the
remedy. 8 6
A constructive trust imposed for the purpose of effectuating
cleanup of contaminated property might also possess certain char-
acteristics of a charitable trust. According to one author: "[alt its
simplest, a trust requires a creator, a beneficiary, a trustee, and
trust property .... In the case of a charitable trust, which must be
created to serve some public purpose, beneficiaries are often un-
specified or defined only as members of the public."8 7 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts similarly describes some of the
characteristics of charitable trusts:
In the case of a charitable trust there need not be and ordinarily
is not a definite beneficiary, and the trustee is ordinarily not in
a fiduciary relation to any specific person. The trustee of a char-
itable trust, however, is subject to duties as fiduciary similar to
those to which the trustee of a private trust is subject, and he
incurs similar liabilities .... The remedy for the violation of his
duties by the trustee of a charitable trust is ordinarily at the
suit of the Attorney General.88
85. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. b (1937); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 73 cmt. b (1959) ("A constructive trust arises where a person hold-
ing title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.").
86. Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 419, 422 (Fla. 1927) (emphasis added).
87. Peter Manus, To a Candidate in Search of an Environmental Theme: Promote
the Public Trust, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 323-24 (2000) (footnotes omitted) (citing
GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 167 (1987) ("A trust may have as its purpose the accom-
plishment of advantages to society. Such a trust is called a public or charitable
trust."); BOGERT, supra, at 201-07, 235-37 (discussing governmental trusts, or trusts
initiated to make the life of the community safer)).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. a (1959).
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Just as a charitable trust does not require specific benefi-
ciaries, the beneficiaries of an equitable trust created with an
award of restoration damages could be "unspecified or defined
only as members of the public."8 9 Moreover, its obligations could
be enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, as well as fu-
ture or neighboring property owners.
Finally, an equitable trust created for the purpose of effectu-
ating the cleanup of property could possess certain elements of a
public trust. The "public trust doctrine" that has been established
within the laws of many jurisdictions incorporates these elements:
Under American democratic theory, the nation's people possess
an abstract form of sovereignty over the land and its natural
resources that may be termed original ownership. In creating
the government, the people delegated many powers and duties
to its sovereign authority, including managerial responsibilities
over the country's resources. In trust terms, the people desig-
nated the government as trustee of the land and other natural
resources and themselves as beneficiaries. This framework is
particularly analogous to that of a charitable trust, which may
incorporate a public purpose, government trustee, and genera-
lized beneficiaries. 90
The public trust analogy is particularly applicable to the pub-
lic's interest in intergenerational equity that would be implicated
by an award of restoration damages. As noted by one court, "[tihe
beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present generations
but those to come. The check and balance of judicial review pro-
vides a level of protection against improvident dissipation of an
irreplaceable res."91
A wide variety of res have been found to be subject to the pub-
lic trust. Some of these include water resources; 92 submerged
lands;93 hospital property;94 railroad property;95 and funds admin-
istered by public officials. 96
89. Manus, supra note 87, at 324.
90. Id.
91. In re Water Use Permit Applications, Petitions for Interim Instream Flow
Standard Amendments, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000) (quoting Ariz. Cent. for Law in
Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)).
92. See, e.g., id.
93. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
94. See, e.g., Fowler v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 810 P.2d 822 (Okla. 1991).
95. See, e.g., Pueblo & Ark. Valley R. Co. v. Taylor, 6 Colo. 1 (Colo. 1881).
96. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 939 S.W.2d 270 (Ark. 1997).
804 [Vol. 20
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss2/5
REFORMING THE LAW
The creation of an equitable "cleanup trust" has been sug-
gested by at least one court sitting in bankruptcy. Specifically, in
the case of AL Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Interna-
tional, Inc.,97 the district court faced a situation in which the
bankruptcy court had disallowed the CERCLA cost-recovery
claim98 of AL Tech, a bankruptcy creditor and subsequent owner
of contaminated property, against Allegheny International, the
prior owner and bankruptcy debtor. 99 The bankruptcy court had
held that the claim should be disallowed pursuant to Section
502(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, 100 which requires that the
court must disallow any claim as to which the claimant and the
debtor are mutually liable to a third-party creditor. 10 Allegheny
had argued that the CERCLA claim was one that should be as-
serted in the first instance by the Environmental Protection
Agency. 10 2 The district court disagreed, noting that "AL Tech does
not seek to recover response costs owed to, or incurred by, the
EPA, the DEC, or any other third party, but instead seeks to re-
cover response costs it has directly incurred and will directly incur
in the future."'0 3
In ruling against the bankruptcy debtor on the issue of the
viability of the CERCLA claim, the district court addressed the
principal concern of the bankruptcy judge:
The bankruptcy court expressed concern that allowance of
AL Tech's claims could result in double liability to the debtor if
AL Tech fails to clean up the sites and the EPA then brings an
action against debtor for remediation of the hazardous sites.
Such possibility troubles this Court as well. However, the grav-
ity of this possibility can be diminished. For example, . . . as
suggested by AL Tech, the bankruptcy court can require that
any distributions on AL Tech's claim be placed in a trust to be
expended on the remediation of the waste sites.... Creation of a
trust to be expended on contingent claims is a frequently used
mechanism for insuring that such funds are properly disbursed.
In the present case, use of a trust would be an effective means of
97. 126 B.R. 919 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000); discussion supra note 27.
99. Allegheny, 126 B.R. at 920.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(B).
101. Allegheny, 126 B.R. at 921.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 923.
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guaranteeing that distributions on AL Tech's claim be used to
remediate the waste sites.104
One court, following Allegheny and facing a concurrence of the
parties regarding the manner in which the claim's proceeds
should be administered, oversaw the establishment of a cleanup
trust.105
Clearly, it would be well within the authority of a court sitting
in equity to establish a constructive or equitable trust using the
proceeds of an award of restoration damages. Just as public and
charitable trusts may establish a vague or uncertain class of bene-
ficiaries, including current and future members of the public, so
too could an equitable trust created for the purpose of remediating
environmental contamination on a specific parcel of property be
established for the benefit of the present and future neighboring
community. The trustee could be designated as the current prop-
erty owner, a special master designated for the purpose of ensur-
ing remediation, or a specific governmental agency or entity. The
right to enforce the fiduciary relationship could be specifically de-
fined by the court, or vested in an arm of the state government. In
this manner, a court addressing a claim for restoration damages
could establish a framework for ensuring effective remediation,
while alleviating concerns over plaintiffs' unjust enrichment.
V. The Recommended Reforms in Practice
The principal thrusts of the foregoing discussion have been
the recommendations that, insofar as the issue of restoration dam-
ages is concerned, (1) the temporary/permanent distinction should
be abandoned to the extent that it has been used to determine
whether damages should be measured by the diminution in value
of contaminated property, or rather the full cost of restoration; (2)
an alternative paradigm should be created that awards restora-
tion damages for those areas and/or fractions of contamination
that can cost-effectively be remediated, and that awards diminu-
tion-in-value damages as to those that cannot; (3) arbitrary limita-
tions on recovery of restoration damages based on the market
value of property, proportionality or another yardstick should be
dispensed with; and (4) as to sums of money actually tendered
104. Id. at 924 (citations omitted); see also Francis E. Goodwyn, Claims Estimation
and the Use of the "Cleanup Trust" in Environmental Bankruptcy Cases, 9 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 769, 807-13 (2001).
105. See In re Harvard Indus., Inc., 138 B.R. 10, 14 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992).
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pursuant to an award of restoration damages, those sums should
be placed into an equitable cleanup trust, which should be admin-
istered for the benefit of future property owners and members of
the public. The discussion that follows will describe the manner
in which these recommendations, if implemented, might have af-
fected the outcome of a case such as that presented to the court in
Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc. '0 6
Recall that in Ewell, plaintiffs owned an undivided interest in
land located adjacent to property on which defendant had oper-
ated an industrial waste disposal facility, at which drums of toxic
waste had been buried. 10 7 Some of the wastes had leaked onto
plaintiffs' property.108 The court described the property as swamp
land that "prior to being polluted ... was used seasonally for graz-
ing of cattle, and, non-commercially, for hunting and fishing. Its
only other commercial use was for the growing of timber."'1 9 After
reviewing Louisiana law as to the issue of the measure of dam-
ages, the court in Ewell found that the proper measure of damages
must be determined from the individual circumstances of the case.
In light of the fact that the property was valued at $200,000,
whereas restoration of the property, according to plaintiffs, would
cost 170 million dollars, the court found that the jury's award rep-
resenting the diminution in the property's value was "the maxi-
mum award permissible under the circumstances." 110
Several questions come to mind when reviewing the facts in
Ewell in light of the discussion above. First, who now pays for the
cleanup of the property? Should it be left to the taxpayer, or to
future generations? Or should the negligent polluter be given the
reward of an inexpensive, unpermitted disposal facility that costs
him only the market value of the property, which he would have
had to have paid in any event? Should this prime Louisiana
marshland be left in its polluted state, endangering native species
and human visiters? Based on the court's pronouncement in
Ewell, the only function of the courts is to ensure that the owner's
financial interest in the property is compensated. There is no con-
sideration of the public's interest in health and safety, equity, de-
terrence, or environmental aesthetics.
106. 364 So. 2d 604, 608-09 (La. Ct. App. 1978); see discussion supra text accompa-
nying notes 61-68.
107. Ewell, 364 So. 2d at 606.
108. Id. at 605-06.
109. Id. at 609.
110. Id.
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Consider how the outcome in Ewell might have been different
given the paradigm proposed herein. First, a jury considering the
facts of the case would have been asked to determine what portion
of the property could be remediated cost-effectively, in contrast to
the level of contamination that can be allowed to remain without
exposing persons, flora and fauna to unnecessary or undue harm.
These levels can be determined with reference to regulatory or
other applicable or reasonable and appropriate requirements. 1"'
Where the defendant's conduct has been particularly egregious,
such fact can be used to adjust the cost-benefit equation.- 2
Once the factfinder has determined the appropriate measure
of damages to be used for restoration, the sum of money represent-
ing that amount can be placed into a trust created for the benefit
of future owners, neighbors, and/or the general public. The trus-
tee can be a professional mediator, scientist, governmental entity,
landowner, or other trusted designee of the court. Such a trust
would possess elements of a constructive trust because it would be
designed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the property-owner/
plaintiff, who might otherwise use the proceeds for a selfish pur-
pose.' 1 3 The trust would also possess the characteristics of a char-
itable trust, insofar as it would be designated for the public
purposes of protecting human health and the environment, and to
the extent that the trust's beneficiaries would be unspecified, or
defined as members of the general public.1 4 Finally, the cleanup
trust would derive authority from the public-trust doctrine, inso-
far as it can be said that the people designated the government as
trustee of their land and other natural resources in the first in-
stance. 1" 5 Pursuant to the doctrine, to the extent that an entity
claiming ownership of property has defiled those resources, the
government's designee is authorized to intervene and allocate the
funds necessary to protect those resources on behalf of the trust's
beneficiaries, which would be comprised of present and future
members of the general public.
Once an "equitable cleanup trust" is created, certain aspects
of the trust could be left to the discretion of the court. For exam-
ple, the court could designate the parties who would be allowed to
challenge the propriety of disbursements from the trust, and the
111. See supra text accompanying note 27.
112. See supra part III.G.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
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procedures by which they could do so. Provisions for the payment
of attorneys' fees and experts' fees could be incorporated into the
decree establishing the trust. If proceeds were left in the trust
upon completion of cleanup activities, the court could determine
whether such proceeds should be returned to the parties, or to an
alternative public purpose. Such considerations could be left to
the courts in particular jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it seems clear
that utilization of the mechanism of an equitable cleanup trust
would bear enormous advantages over existing doctrines for allo-
cation of environmental damages.
VI. Conclusion
From the standpoint of a plaintiff whose property has become
contaminated by environmental pollutants, damage remedies that
are designed to promote full restoration of property have been
slow to evolve. Anachronistic limitations on recovery based on
property value fail to take into account the public's interest in en-
suring an effective cleanup. Exceptions to those limitations based
on personal use similarly fail to take into account the public's in-
terest, and otherwise provide a subjective and unpredictable mea-
sure of relief.
The evolution of the law applicable to awards of restoration
damages have been thwarted by the perception that plaintiffs who
would receive such awards would be unjustly enriched. In some
cases, those fears have been mitigated by the existence of statu-
tory obligations to effectuate cleanup, or by the punitive nature of
an award representing the full cost of restoration in cases of par-
ticularly egregious conduct. Nevertheless, it appears clear that if
a court were to invoke equitable doctrines permitting the estab-
lishment of an equitable trust that would administer cleanup
funds, both the plaintiffs interest in a complete remedy and the
public's interest in effectuating a prompt and effective cleanup
would be well-served.
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